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DOES GERMAN DEVELOPMENT AID PROMOTE GERMAN EXPORTS? 
Abstract  
This paper uses a static and dynamic gravity model of trade to investigate the link between 
German development aid and exports from Germany to the recipient countries. The findings 
indicate that in the long run,German aid is associated with an increase in exports of goods that 
is larger than the aid flow, with a point estimate of 140 percent of the aid given. In addition, 
the evolution of the estimated coefficients over time shows an effect that is consistently 
positive but which oscillates over time. Interestingly, in the period from 2001 to 2005, a 
steady increase in the effect of aid on trade can be observed following a decrease in this 
phenomenon in the second half of the nineties. The paper also distinguishes among recipient 
countries and finds that the return on aid measured by German exports is higher for aid to 
countries considered “strategic aid recipients” by the German government.  
Key Words: F10; F35 
JEL Classification: International Trade; Foreign Aid; Germany 
1. Introduction 
The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG8) are to promote growth 
and to reduce poverty in developing countries.  In support of this effort, MDG8 calls for a 
new partnership for development, encompassing the goal of providing higher levels of aid to 
countries committed to poverty reduction. In recent decades, a great deal of research effort 
has been devoted to investigating the effects of development assistance on the economic 
performance of the recipient countries (e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hanssen and Tarp, 
2001) and to clarifying the recent debate on how aid can help increase the level of exports 
from developing countries, in line with  the “aid for trade” concept (Morrisey, 2006).  
Although promoting economic development is one of the main objectives of foreign- 
aid programs, the motivations for giving aid are diverse and include historical ties and   3
political and strategic goals, as well as consideration of the economic interests of aid-giving 
countries (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  
Given that the economic interests of aid-giving countries play a role in aid allocation, 
it is surprising that only a few authors have investigated the economic effects of aid from a 
donor’s perspective (Nilson, 1998; Wagner, 2003; Osei, Morrisey, and Lloyd, 2004). In 
particular, the question arises whether the official development assistance (ODA) promotes 
exports from donors to recipient countries. This question is of special interest to Germany 
since the German government is committed, according to EU plans, and in line with various 
international commitments, to increasing its official development aid to 0.7 percent by 2015. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, German ODA was below 0.3 percent of GDP, rising to 0.37 
percent (or about 9B US$) in 2005.  To reach the goal of 0.7 percent and accounting for 
economic growth in the interim will imply that German ODA must more than double in real 
terms in the next eight years.  
The only empirical study that quantifies the impact of aid on German exports is, to our 
knowledge, Vogler-Ludwig et al. (1999). Using data for the period 1976 through 1995 and 
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regressions, the authors found that one 
Deutschmark spent on ODA increased exports by 4.3 Deutschmarks. The purpose of this 
paper is to address this issue using a longer time horizon, a much larger country sample, a 
more comprehensive set of control variables, and more advanced panel econometric 
techniques than previous studies, as well as using a number of robustness checks and fixed 
effects for country groups and different time periods.  We estimate a static and a dynamic 
gravity model of German exports to 138 recipients augmented with development aid for the 
period 1962 to 2005.   
To summarize our main results, we find that the increase in exports flowing from 
German aid is somewhat more moderate: around $0.70-$1.4 US increase of exports for every 
aid dollar spent. In addition, the effect is greater for developing countries which are target   4
countries of the German Ministry of Development (so called “BMZ countries”), i.e., countries 
where German aid is given based on agreements between the German government and the 
recipient-country government.
5   The overall effect is remarkably robust but oscillates over 
time.  It is always positive and has increased in recent years (after a decline in the 1990s).   
Interestingly, we find no effect of aid given by the European Union (partly paid for by 
German contributions to the EU) on German export levels. 
Section 2 presents the theoretical background. Section 3 reviews the recent literature 
on trade and aid. Section 4 discusses the structure of German aid over time and across 
recipients. Section 5 presents the model specification, data sources and variables and main 
results. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
In international trade theory researchers have long studied the welfare implications of 
bilateral transfers for donor and recipient countries. The first public discussion of this topic 
was the Keynes-Ohlin debate in relation to the paradoxical effects of German reparations
6. 
Leontieff (1936) also raised the possibility of transfer paradoxes in that foreign aid can be 
donor-enriching and recipient-immiserizing. Since then, the theoretical literature on transfer 
paradoxes has been extended to cover more general settings and the findings indicate that 
while such paradoxes can still occur, under certain conditions, both donors and recipients can 
benefit from aid transfers (Gale, 1974; Brecher and Bhagwati, 1981, 1982; Bhagwati, 
Brecher, and Hatta, 1983, 1984). Bhagwati et al. (2004) present an early survey of this 
literature. 
                                                 
5 Other developing countries also receive aid, but through different channels, such as funding from private 
foundations that receive support from the German government, government scholarships to students from these 
countries to study in Germany, and government support for German NGOs providing emergency assistance and 
other project support in that country.  In these cases, the aid flow was not a result of German aid policy targeted 
to that particular country but rather an outcome of the policies and processes of these different programs.   
6 Keynes  (1929a,1929b,1929c) and Ohlin (1929a,1929b).   5
More recently, Djajic, Lahiri, and Raimondos-Moller (2004) studied the welfare 
implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of an intertemporal model of trade. They 
find that the net benefits of an aid transfer may change over time for both the donor and the 
recipient. Assuming economic and political stability in the recipient country, a temporary 
transfer of income in the first period improves Period One welfare of the recipient and lowers 
that of the donor. But in the presence of habit-formation effects, aid in Period One may serve 
to shift preferences of the recipient in favor of the donor’s export goods in Period Two. When 
the terms-of-trade effect associated with this shift is sufficiently large and the real rate of 
interest is sufficiently low, the second period welfare gain of the donor (at the expense of the 
recipient) overshadows its Period One loss. In addition, this transaction also results in a net 
increase in welfare of the recipient country if the real rate of interest used to discount the 
Period Two loss is sufficiently high, making its present value smaller than the Period One 
gain. 
In this paper we focus exclusively on the effect of aid on the donor’s exports. With 
this aim and taking into account the above-mentioned theoretical considerations, we expect 
that, in the context of an intertemporal model of trade, development aid could lead to an 
increase in the donor’s exports for several reasons.  First, there might be an impact as a result 
of the fact that a considerable share of donor aid in the time period we analyze was previously 
tied to exports from the donor country.  Up until the 1990s, approximately 50 percent of the 
donors’ development aid was tied to exports. However, this number is much smaller today, 
and for the German case amounts to only 7 percent of development aid (Development 
Assistance Committee, OECD (2007)).  While tied aid is on the decline and now rarely given, 
it might have an effect.  This “tied aid” effect would clearly be smaller than the amount of aid 
sent, as a considerable share of aid is spent paying local labor, funding technical assistance, 
and purchasing local supplies, and would thus not show up as exports from the donor country. 
Second, we hypothesize that there may be habit-formation effects in the sense that donor-  6
funded exports for aid-related projects might increase the proclivity of recipient countries to 
buy goods from the donor, as discussed in the model of Djajic et al (2004).  Such an effect 
would go beyond tied aid and might be much larger than the direct effect of tied aid.  Third, 
we assume that the aid relationship promotes a trade relationship in the sense that it creates 
“goodwill” towards donor exporters and as donor countries might often combine aid missions 
and negotiations with trade missions, the aid relationship might “open the door” for donor 
exporters.   
In order to evaluate this effect empirically, we have chosen the gravity model of trade 
as a basic framework. Solid theoretical foundations that provide a consistent base for 
empirical analysis have been developed in the past three decades for this model (Anderson, 
1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The major contribution of 
Anderson and van Wincoop (AvW) was the appropriate modeling of trade costs to explain 
bilateral exports.  The AvW model has been recently extended to applications explicitly 
involving developed and less developed countries by Nelson and Juhasz Silva (2007). They 
present an extension of AvW to the asymmetric north-south case and derive some 
implications related to the effect of aid on trade. Their results indicate that if the economy of a 
donor country (GDP) is larger than that of the recipient country by at least the monetary value 
of the foreign aid, there is an increase in exports from the larger country to the smaller. The 
intuitive rationale behind this effect is that the more similar in size two countries are, the more 
they trade with one another. 
 
3. Empirical Literature on Aid and Trade 
We now turn to the existing empirical literature on aid and trade. In line with the focus 
of our study, we concentrate on the causal links from aid flows to trade flows.  
In recent years, a number of researchers have investigated the relationship between aid 
and bilateral trade flows from donors to recipients. Some of them focus on quantifying the   7
impact of donors’ aid on trade. Since in many cases aid was once contingent upon purchasing 
goods from the donor, tied aid may automatically create such export effects.  
The recent literature has been divided on the effect of aid on exports from donor 
countries.  Most studies use the gravity model of trade as the empirical framework. Among 
those who found a positive effect of aid on trade was Nilson (1998), who analyzed the link 
between aid and exports for European Union donors to 108 recipients. He estimated a static 
specification of the gravity model for the period 1975 to 1992 (three-year averages) and found 
an elasticity of exports with respect to aid of 0.23 that translates into a $2.6 US increase of 
exports for each dollar of aid given. He also computed donors’ specific elasticities, and for 
Germany the return on foreign aid was a $3.16 increase in exports for each dollar of aid given. 
Wagner (2003) also used a gravity model of trade to investigate the effect of aid on trade for 
twenty donors to 109 recipient countries for the years 1970 to 1990. He obtained elasticities 
of trade with respect to aid in the range of 0.062 (for fixed-effects (FE) specification) to 0.195 
(for the pooled OLS). The estimated average return on donors’ aid according to the OLS 
result was $2.29 of exports per dollar of aid. They also decomposed the direct and indirect 
effects of aid on trade and found that the direct effect was only a 35-cent increase and much 
lower than the indirect effect (98 cents). In addition, he concluded that the effect of past aid 
on trade was positive although very small (18 cents). 
In the second subset of the literature, we find some studies that deviate from the 
gravity model framework. A few authors studied the direction of the causality by using 
Granger causality tests. On the one hand, Arvin, Cater, and Choudhry (2000) examined the 
direction of the causality between untied assistance and exports using German data for the 
period 1973 to 1995. Their findings provide some support for the export-promotion 
hypothesis whereby untied aid disbursements generate goodwill for the donor. On the other 
hand, Lloyd, McGillivray, Morrisey, and Osei (2000) examined data on aid and trade flows 
for a sample of four European donors and 26 African recipients over the period from 1969 to   8
1995. Using Granger causality tests, they found that there is little evidence showing that aid 
increases trade in a dynamic sense (only in 14 percent of the cases) and claim that the 
argument for tied aid is unproven in their analysis.  Instead, they find that a more common 
link is that trade relations are a factor influencing donor allocation, rather than that aid 
generates these trade relations. Along the same lines, Osei, Morrisey, and Lloyd (2004) 
extended the analysis to more countries and also found no evidence that aid generates trade 
when testing for the relationship between aid and trade for different subsamples, although 
donors providing a higher share of aid tend to trade more with the recipients. They conclude 
that donors appear to be concerned with relative aid and trade shares rather than absolute 
volumes. 
Our challenge and contribution in this paper is to consider dynamic effects of aid, as in 
the second strand of the literature, but relying on the gravity model of trade, as in the first 
strand of the literature.  In addition, we will examine a longer time period, more recipient 
countries, more covariates, and a more advanced econometric framework, and will use 
extensive robustness checks.  
 
4. The Volume and Structure of German aid 
The standard used to measure development funding is the Official Development Assistance as 
a percentage of Gross National Income (ODA/GNI ratio). The repository of official 
information on aid is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. DAC has 
two lists of countries. “Part I” countries are grouped into five categories: least developed 
countries (LDCs), other low-income countries (other LICs), low middle-income countries 
(LMICs), upper middle-income countries (UMICs), and high-income countries (HICs). “Part 
II” countries refer to transition or upper middle-income-level countries. Aid given to members 
listed in Part I is called ODA, whereas aid given to members listed in Part II is called “official 
aid” (OA). With successive revisions, recipient country history on this two-part List became   9
increasingly complex.  At the same time, aid to more advanced developing and transition 
countries declined as they became more prosperous, with several former Soviet bloc states 
joining the European Union and becoming donors themselves.  The DAC therefore decided in 
2005 to revert to a single List of ODA Recipients, abolishing Part II. 
ODA is further classified into bilateral ODA (given directly by a donor country) and 
multilateral ODA (given by an international institution such as the World Bank or the United 
Nations). As with most studies on aid, we focus on bilateral ODA, but specifically, that given 
by Germany. We also consider the effect of ODA given by the European Community (as part 
of the multilateral aid).  We do this to find out whether a bilateral aid relationship has stronger 
effects than a multilateral one on the exports of individual donor countries.   
Development aid has to satisfy three criteria to be classified as ODA. First, it has to be 
undertaken by official agencies. Second, the main objective of aid has to be the promotion of 
economic development, and third and finally, it has to have a grant element of at least 25 
percent. It is worth noting that neither private aid given by non-governmental organizations 
nor military aid is considered part of ODA.  
How much does Germany spend on development? Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows 
the German ODA-to-GNI ratio over the period from 1964 to 2005. Aid flows increased in the 
late 1970s and decreased in the 1980s and 1990s. Only after 1999 is a steady increase 
observed. In terms of relative importance, in the past three decades Germany has been among 
the five most important donors in terms of bilateral aid. According to OECD figures, German 
bilateral aid accounts for around 10 to 15 percent of total bilateral aid. 
Concerning the geographical distribution, Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows the 
regional distribution of German ODA. German aid is more evenly distributed among 
recipients than is aid from the other larger donors. A higher percentage is directed to South 
Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa, especially in the most recent years, 
whereas aid shares to Latin America and Asia show a decreasing trend.    10
 
5. Specification and estimation of the gravity model  
5.1 Model specification 
The gravity model of trade is nowadays the most commonly accepted framework to model 
bilateral trade flows (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003). 
According to the underlying theory, trade between two countries is explained by nominal 
incomes and the populations of the trading countries, by the distance between the economic 
centers of the exporter and importer, and by a number of other factors aiding or preventing 
trade between them. Dummy variables, such as trade agreements, common language, or a 
common border, are generally used to proxy for these factors. The traditional gravity model is 
specified as 
 
ij ij ij j i j i ij u F DIST POP POP Y Y X
6 5 4 3 2 1
0
α α α α α α α = ,                                                      (1) 
 
where Yi (Yj) indicates the GDPs of the exporter (importer), POPi (POPj) are exporter 
(importer) populations,  DISTij is geographical distances between countries i and j, and Fij 
denotes other factors aiding or preventing trade (e.g., trade agreements, common language, or 
a common border). 
The gravity model has been used broadly to investigate the role played by specific policy or 
geographical variables in explaining bilateral trade flows. Consistent with this approach and 
in order to investigate the effect of development aid on German exports, we augment the 
traditional model with bilateral and multilateral aid and also with exchange rates
7. Usually the 
model is estimated in log-linear form. Taking logarithms in Equation 1, restricting the income 
                                                 
7 When the gravity model is estimated using panel data (with a time dimension), exchange rates are generally 
included as important determinants of bilateral trade flows over time.   11
and population coefficients to be equal (α1 =α2 and α3=α4) and introducing time variation, the 
static specification of the gravity model is 
 
jt jt jt jt j jt jt jt
jt j jt Gt jt Gt j t jt
COL WTO INDEP ACP LDC EUAID BAID
LNEXRN DIST POP POP Y Y X
η α α α α α α α
α α α α δ φ γ
+ + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + =
13 12 11 10 9 8 7
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ln ln
ln ) ln( ) ln( ln
            ( 2 )  
 
where:  
ln denotes variables in natural logs; 
Xjt  are the exports from Germany to country j in period t in current US$,; 
YGt, Yjt indicates Germany’s and the recipient’s GDP, respectively, in period t at current PPP 
US$; 
POPGt, POPjt denotes the population of Germany and country j respectively, in period t in 
thousand inhabitants; 
DISTij is the great circle distance between Germany and country j; 
EXRNjt is the nominal bilateral exchange rate in monetary units of the recipient currency per 
Euro; 
BAIDjt is bilateral official gross development aid from Germany to country j in current US$; 
and EUAIDt is EU official gross development aid to country j in current US$; 
The model includes a number of dummy variables for trading partners sharing specific trade 
agreements (ACP), for former German colonies (COL), for independent countries
8 (INDEP), 
for countries belonging to the GATT/WTO (WTO), as well as for Least Developed Countries 
(LDC).  t φ is specific time effects that control for omitted variables common to all trade flows 
but which vary over time. j δ are importer effects that proxy for multilateral resistance factors. 
When these effects are included, the influence of the dummies that vary only with the “j” 
                                                 
8 INDEP takes the value of one if the country is an independent state in a given year, zero otherwise.   12
dimension cannot be directly estimated. Since the variable of interest is development aid, the 
income and population coefficients are restricted to be equal. 
Considering that trade relations once established might last for a long time, it makes 
sense to consider that current export volumes also depend on past exports. Therefore, we 
estimate a dynamic version of Equation 2. In order to model dynamics, we consider the 
introduction of the Koyck geometric lag structure that includes the lagged dependent variable 
as an additional regressor. The main problems of this specification are related to the statistical 
difficulties caused by the combination of an endogenous regressor (lagged exports) and 
autocorrelated errors. As a result, the OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent (the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased towards unity, whereas the remaining 
coefficients are biased towards zero).  
Nevertheless, these difficulties can be easily overcome using more sophisticated 
estimation techniques that control for endogeneity of the explanatory variables and for 
autocorrelated errors. The dynamic specification is given by 
 
jt jt j jt jt jt jt
j jt Gt jt Gt t j j t jt
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DIST POP POP Y Y X X
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             (3) 
where most of the variables are described above and Xj,t-1  is exports from Germany to country 
j in period t-1 in current US$. Since some of the dummies (mainly COL and WTO) were not 
statistically significant in the static model, they are not included in the dynamic model.  
According to equations 2 and 3 we are assuming that the relationship between German aid 
and German exports is linear, this is plausible looking at the scatter plot between both 
variables (Appendix 5) and also given the small magnitude of the aid figures in comparison to 
the export figures. Specification tests also rejected the inclusion of a quadratic aid-term in the 
estimated equation.   13
5.2 Data sources and variables 
Official Development Aid data are from the OECD Development Database on Aid 
from DAC Members
9. We consider gross ODA disbursements in current US$
10, instead of aid 
commitments, because we are interested in the funds actually released to the recipient 
countries in a given year. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial 
resources, or the transfer of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. Bilateral exports 
are obtained from the UN COMTRADE database. Data on income and population variables 
are drawn from the World Bank (World Development Indicators Database, 2007). Bilateral 
exchange rates are from the IMF statistics. Distances between capitals have been computed as 
great-circle distances using data on straight-line distances in kilometres, latitudes and 
longitudes from the CIA World Fact Book. 
 
5.3 Results 
A static and a dynamic version of the model are estimated for data on German exports 
and development aid (ODA) to 138 recipient countries during the period from 1962 to 2005. 
Table 1 reports the main estimation results obtained for the static model. The first column 
shows the results obtained for all countries. Individual (country) effects (modeled as fixed) 
are included to control for unobservable heterogeneous effects across recipients. Time-fixed 
effects are also included to model specific unobservable time effects. Those effects are also a 
proxy for the so-called “multilateral resistance” factors modeled by Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003). We rely on the two-way FE estimates, since a Wald test indicates that the 
individual effects are jointly significant, while a Hausman test indicates that these effects are 
correlated with the error term. Since our data consists on a time span of more than 40 years 
and a cross-section of 138 countries, we tested for the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. The results of the Wooldrige test for autocorrelation in panel data and the 
                                                 
9 www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline. 
10 The gross amount comprises total grants and loans extended (according to DAC).    14
LR test for heterostedasticity indicate that both problems are present in the data. Hence, given 
the strong rejection of the null in both tests, the model is re-estimated with HAC 
(heteroskedastic and autocorrelated consistent standard errors) that are robust to 
autocorrelation and to heteroskedasticity. Column 2 reports the results for the two-way FE 
estimates with a common AR(1) term, and columns 3 and 4 report the result obtained when 
using feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) with an AR(1) term common to all recipients 
and with a specific AR(1) term, respectively.  
With respect to the variable of interest, bilateral aid, controlling for autocorrelation 
slightly decrease the magnitude of the estimated coefficient from 0.08 to 0.056. The estimated 
coefficient is always positive and significant, indicating that a one-percent increase in German 
aid raises German exports by 0.056 percent. The effect is small compared to that shown in 
previous studies that did not control for country and time effects, but still positive and 
significant. However, the estimated coefficient for the EU official gross development aid is 
negative and not statistically significant in the first two specifications, whereas it is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level when controlling for heteroskedasticity (FGLS 
results). This suggests that Germany does not benefit from EU aid. This implies that the 
“habit formation,” “goodwill,” and “door-opening” factors are not present in EU aid, at least 
not for German exporters.
11  
Most of the other variables present the expected sign and are statistically significant. 
The explanatory power of the model is good, since the included variables explain 
approximately 70 percent of the variation of German exports. The coefficient of total income 
is positive and significant and slightly lower than the theoretical value of unity. The same 
holds for the coefficient of total population which is negative and only statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level in the FGLS specification with specific AR(1) terms. The bilateral 
                                                 
11 It would be interesting to investigate whether other EU members profit more from EU aid.  The failure of EU 
exports to influence trade may also be related to the fact that EU aid is of a different type than direct aid from the 
donor countries, being more humanitarian and food aid, for which the export effects are likely to be smaller.     15
exchange rate has a negative coefficient that is only statistically significant when 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are not controlled for. The negative sign indicates that 
depreciation of the Euro (a decrease in the exchange rate) with respect to the recipient 
currencies would have a positive effect on German exports. Distance from Germany to the 
recipient countries also seems to be an impediment to German exports, with a coefficient 
which is negative and always significant at the one-percent level. However, the effect of 
distance could not be directly estimated in the two-way FE estimation. Since distance is 
constant over time, its effect is subsumed in the country dummies. The LDC and ACP 
dummies are negative and significant indicating that Germany exports less to least developed 
countries and ACP countries than to the rest of countries in the sample and the “independent 
state” dummy presents a positive sign and is significant in the FGLS estimations. For 
comparison purposes, Table A.3.1 shows the OLS, random effects (RE), and FE estimates for 
yearly data and Table A.3.2 present the results of estimating Equation 2 on data of five-year 
averages, to reduce the effects of temporary shocks and to avoid cyclical effects. Two main 
differences are encountered with respect to the estimation for yearly data. First, the effect of 
German aid on German exports is considerably higher in magnitude than before (0.11). 
Second, the coefficients of populations, EU aid, and “independent state” dummy are no longer 
significant, according to the RE and FE estimates. 
Summarizing, we find that, in static terms, the average return on aid for German exports is 
approximately 0.70 US dollar increase in exports for every aid dollar spent
12.  
 
Tables 2 through 4 report the main estimation results obtained for the dynamic model 
(Equation 3). In general, the estimated parameter for lagged exports is always statistically 
significant and with the expected positive sign pointing towards the importance of persistence 
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in export flows. The short-term coefficients of the variables are smaller than the long-term 
coefficients and the latter are slightly higher than those obtained before (static model) with the 
signs remaining generally unchanged. 
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the dynamic model with the variables in levels. 
The first column shows the OLS results with a common constant (δj=δ). Since the country-
specific effects are jointly significant ( δ δ ≠ j ), we cannot rely on the OLS estimates to make 
inference. Likewise, the time-specific effects are also statistically significant ( φ φ ≠ t ) and 
therefore, the two-way FE model is preferred to the one-way FE model. Therefore, the second 
and third columns present the within-regression estimates with two-way (country and time-
specific) fixed effects and with an added AR(1) term, respectively, to correct for 
autocorrelation in the residuals
13. The fourth column (Table 2) reports the results using 
2SLS
14 (in the context of Generalized Method of Moment estimation) to control for the 
endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable. The Hausman test indicates that only the within 
estimator
15 is consistent, since the null hypothesis (orthogonality between the individual 
effects and the regressors) is rejected. In addition, the 2SLS within estimates are less precisely 
(higher standard errors), but consistently, estimated.
16 
According to the above figure, the long-term average return on aid for German exports is a 
1.4-dollar increase in exports for every aid dollar spent. Therefore, aid appears to be export-
creating when dynamics are modeled and the magnitude of the effect is higher than the one 
obtained using the static model.  
                                                 
13 The Bhargava et al. modified Durwin-Watson test and the Baltagi-Wu test indicate autocorrelated residuals 
(second column) that disappear when an AR(1) term is added to the model (Column 3). 
14 We use STATA enhanced routines (xtivreg2) that address HAC standard errors, weak instruments and tests for 
endogeneity, functional form and autocorrelation for IV and GMM estimates, as described in Baum et al. 2007. 
15 Although the Hausman tests point towards the inconsistency of the random-effects estimates (not reported), 
the coefficient estimates for bilateral aid are practically equal in magnitude and sign. 
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With respect to the other variables included in the model, the expected positive 
coefficient for income is obtained; Germany exports more to countries with higher income. 
Population in the recipient countries shows a negative coefficient which is only significant in 
the 2SLS results. EU aid shows, as in the static model, a negative effect; however, this effect 
is not significant when controlling for autocorrelation and for endogeneity of the lagged 
dependent variable (columns 3 and 4 in Table 2). The dynamic model also clearly confirms 
that EU aid does not have an export-promoting effect for Germany.   
Column 5 of Table 2 present the results obtained when lagged aid is added to the list 
of explanatory variables. We find that lagged aid does not affect exports since the 
corresponding estimated parameter is not significant. The reason for this could be that we are 
using aid disbursements and it is the announcement of the policy decision (aid commitment) 
which is the factor primarily influencing future donor’s exports, whereas the actual 
international transfer (disbursements) has an effect exclusively on present exports.  
Next, in order to test for the stability of the estimated coefficients over time, Equation 
3 is estimated for eight different sub-periods. Although the first-differences GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) has commonly been used in the literature of dynamic 
panel data estimations for short time spans, when data are highly persistent, as in the case of 
bilateral export flows, Blundell and Bond (1998) argued that this procedure can be improved 
by using the system GMM estimation, which supplements the equations in first differences 
with equations in levels; for the former, the instruments used are the lagged levels, and for the 
latter, the instruments are the lagged differences. Table 3 shows the results using system 
GMM for eight different subperiods. We keep the number of years in each period below eight 
because the number of instruments tends to explode upwards with time. The use of too many 
instruments, can over-fit endogenous variables and weaken the power of the Hansen test to 
detect over-identification. In the present case, the Hansen test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of validity of the instruments and the autocorrelation tests indicate that first (in   18
four subsamples) and second-order (in all subsamples) autocorrelation is not present in the 
data. The results concerning bilateral aid indicate that the return on German aid was much 
lower in the late 1960s and in the 1970s (around 60 cents of exports for each dollar of aid)) 
than in the early eighties (two dollars for each one dollar of aid) and it has been quite stable 
since 1986 onwards (around 1.5 dollars per dollar of aid). This result is reassuring and very 
similar to the average effect found for the whole sample using 2SLS ($1.4 per dollar of aid). 
These results also suggest that tied aid is not the most important driver of these export effects. 
While the export effects seem to have increased over time, tied aid was on the decline.  
As a robustness check, we also estimated Equation 3 for different groups of countries 
(BMZ, non-BMZ, ACP and LDC) in order to ascertain whether the effect of bilateral aid 
could vary among recipients. Since we are interested in the within-country variation and in the 
average-long-term effect, the 2SLS with fixed effects and HAC standard errors provides the 
preferred estimates
17. The results are shown in Table 4. It is worth noting that the return for 
exports on German aid is markedly higher for BMZ countries ($2.82 of exports for each 
dollar of aid), in fact, it is almost twice the average effect for all countries. This is quite 
plausible as only in these countries we would expect the export-increasing effects. Also, for 
the group of non-BMZ countries the coefficient of bilateral aid is not statistically significant. 
Finally, the return for exports is relatively low for ACP countries (0.28), and even lower for 
least-developed countries, for which one dollar of aid generates only 15 cents of exports
18.  
Finally, Figure 1 shows the estimates of the 2SLS fixed-effect model which allows the 
bilateral aid coefficient to be time variant. The evolution of the estimate coefficients over time 
shows a positive long-term trend. Interestingly, in the 2001 to 2005 period, a steady increase 
                                                 
17 The STATA xtivreg2 command with the gmm2s, robust and bw options is used. The gmm2s option requests 
the 2 step feasible efficient GMM estimator, which reduces to standard 2SLS techniques if no robust covariance 
matrix estimator is requested. 
18 These results indicate that what might have appeared to be differences in the variances of the disturbances 
across groups may well be due to heterogeneity associated with the coefficient vectors. This issue is investigated 
in Nowak-Lehmann D., F., Martínez-Zarzoso, I., Klasen, S, and Herzer, D. (2007) where the time series 
variation of the data is exploited and the focus is exclusively on the German aid-trade relationship for BMZ 
countries, which seems to be more robust. 
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in the effect of aid on trade can be observed following a decrease in the nineties. Concerning 
the significance of the coefficients, in only in three short periods (1965 to 1972, 1980 to 1984, 
and 1996 to 2000) were they not significant. In order to control for the high variation of the 
bilateral aid coefficients over time, we also re-estimated the model, averaging the data over 
five-year periods. Figure 2 shows the results. The figure shows a decreasing trend until 1985 
and from then onward, an increasing effect of bilateral German aid on German exports. 
Previous studies found a larger effect of development aid on German exports. For 
example, we obtained a lower return on aid for German exports than Nilsson (1997)
19. He 
reported an average return on aid for exports of a roughly $2.6 increase in exports for every 
dollar spent, whereas in this study, the average return is around $1.5 (although larger for the 
BMZ countries). There are two explanations for the different results obtained by Nilsson 
(1997). First, in Nilsson (1997), the period under study is from 1975 to 1992, whereas we 
considered the period from 1960 to 2005. The larger time span give rise to a lower average 
return on aid. In fact, the results from the regressions for different subperiods indicate that the 
return on aid was higher in the 1980s and early 1990s than it was for the early seventies and 
the late 1990s. Second, in Nilsson (1997), the data were converted to three-year averages of 
constant 1987 dollars and fixed effects were not included; only specific aid coefficients for 
donors and a trend were specified. 
Finally, we also considered the existence of reverse causation. Causation may run 
from exports to aid, as well, since a strong export performance may encourage the donor 
country to increase its level of aid to the recipient. A way to overcome this problem is to 
model German aid as an endogenous variable. Therefore, we also instrumented for 
development aid in the 2SLS regression and in the GMM regressions using the lagged values 
of aid. We then performed and endogeneity test
20. Under the null hypothesis that the specific 
                                                 
19 Also higher than ours was the return on German aid found by Vogler-Ludwig et al. (1999). They found, for the 
period from 1976 to 1995, that one Deutschmark spent on ODA increased exports by 4.3 marks.  
20 In Stata we use the endog option of ivreg2 to test for endogeneity of aid in the trade equation.   20
endogenous regressor can actually be treated as exogenous, the test statistic is distributed as a 
chi
2 with one degree of freedom. The results of the tests are shown at the end of column 4 in 
Table 2 and indicate that its null that bilateral German aid may be treated as exogenous cannot 
be rejected. 
6. Conclusions 
There are three basic messages in this paper. First, German aid has a positive effect on 
German exports. Although the effect is not as large as predicted by previous studies, it is still 
relevant. Our findings indicate that the average return for exports on German aid is about a 
1.4-dollar increase in exports for every dollar spent. Second, this effect differs among groups 
of recipients. The return on German aid for exports is much higher for developing countries 
which have a real aid relationship with Germany (BMZ countries).  Third, this effect is only 
present for German bilateral aid, and not for multilateral aid provided by the EU.    
This investigation and the related literature suggest that the impact of aid on trade 
depends on the specific pair of trading countries evaluated and on the type of aid given, and 
also that the impact can change over time. The relationship between trade and aid could be 
more closely analyzed by using more donor countries, focusing on country case studies, or 
using disaggregated aid data and sectoral trade data to have a more precise characterization of 
the direction of causality and the quantification of the effects. Further research would also be 
desirable on the interactions between development aid and the recipient’s trade policy to 
investigate the existence of complementarities.    21
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Tables 
Table 1. Static model results. Effect of bilateral aid on German exports  
 






LYY  0.769 0.664  0.895  0.919 
  19.259 15.835  59.862  67.84 
LPOP  0.081 -0.277  -0.075  -0.13 
  0.268 -0.534  -1.599  -1.99 
LDIST     -0.732  -0.82 
     -25.142  -25.481 
LEXRN  -0.02 -0.017  -0.002  -0.005 
  -2.277 -1.236  -0.274  -0.851 
LBAIDG  0.082 0.051  0.052  0.056 
  5.167 4.467  6.662  7.946 
LEUAIDG  -0.03 -0.002  -0.035  -0.018 
  -1.771 -0.149  -3.846  -2.14 
LDC  -0.416 -0.658  -0.433  -0.366 
  -2.694 -2.512  -9.058  -8.495 
ACP  -0.02 -0.075  -0.166  -0.093 
  -0.414 -1.139  -4.055  -2.366 
INDEP  0.963 1.488  0.319  0.313 
  3.043 6.582  1.714  1.69 
GATTWTO  -0.033 0.07 0.045  0.017 
  -0.972 1.399  1.574  0.654 
CONSTANT  -6.248 0.845  0.455  1.642 
  -1.162 7.105  0.623  1.548 
Time Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R Sq.  0.695  0.593                











    
Return on Aid  1.030 0.641  0.653  0.703 
Note: Countries in each group are listed in the Appendix. All the variables are in natural logarithms. The 
dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices, LYY is the product of GDPs of Germany and recipient 
country j, LPOP is the product of populations of Germany and recipient country j, LBAIDG is gross bilateral 
German aid to country j, and LEUAIDG is European Union aid to country j. LDC denotes Least Developed 
Countries, ACP denotes African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and INDEP denotes independent states.  All 
the equations were estimated in levels. CAR(1) and SPAR(1) denote common and specific AR(1) terms, that 
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Table 2. Dynamic gravity model estimation results (Equation in levels, yearly data) 
Variables  Pooled OLS  2-Way FE  2-Way FE-AR  2SLS_robust  2SLS_robust 
LX(-1)  0.849 0.592 0.418  0.657  0.679 
  58.257 46.691 28.444  14.136  14.968 
LYY  0.091 0.332 0.464  0.293  0.283 
  7.965 13.971  15.744  5.793  5.172 
LPOP  0.006 -0.211  -0.18 -0.424 -0.618 
  0.301 -0.831  -0.566  -1.939 -3.071 
LDIST  -0.141        
  -8.728        
LEXRN  -0.007 0  -0.003  0.006  0.01 
  -2.734 0.001  -0.356  0.956  1.489 
LBAIDG  0.038 0.044 0.051  0.038  0.062 
  3.956 4.709 4.626  2.635  2.282 
LEUAIDG  -0.025 -0.013 -0.01  -0.007  -0.018 
  -2.504 -1.21  -0.728  -0.392  -0.991 
LDC  -0.096 -0.157 -0.131  -0.195  -0.06 
  -3.768 -0.948 -0.632  -1.585  -0.946 
ACP  -0.129 -0.07  -0.074  -0.073  -0.058 
  -6.043 -2.055 -1.729  -2.386  -1.917 
INDEP  0.518 0.814 1.287  1.129  1.418 
  3.987 6.597 7.641  5.188  5.218 
LBAIDG(-1)        -0.053 
        -1.252 
CONS  0.793  0.449  -0.138                
  2.509  0.096  -0.372                
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
LongRun Aid Coeff  0.252 0.108 0.088  0.111  0.028 
Adj. R Sq.  0.961 0.8  0.72  0.764  0.785 
Nobs  3784 3784 3653  3551  3383 
Log-Likelihood  -2292.813 -1861.722 -1824.846 -1783.176  -1428.831 
RMSE  0.444 0.4056381  0.4016305  0.4072717  0.376327 
Hanson Test       1.585  2.293 
Probability      0.208  0.318 
F test αj  F(130,3597)=4.28      
Hausman   570      
Bhargava et al., DW     2.06     
Baltagi-Wu    2.168     
Return on Aid  3.161  1.354 1.101  1.391   
Endogeneity Test 
Probability 




Note: All the variables are in natural logarithms. The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices, 
LYY is the product of GDPs of Germany and recipient country j, LPOP is the product of populations of 
Germany and recipient country j, LDIST is distance between Germany and recipient country j, LEXCHRN is the 
bilateral exchange rate at current prices, LBAIDG is gross bilateral German aid to country j, and LEUAIDG is 
European Union aid to country j. All the equations were estimated in levels.  denotes rejection of the null 
hypothesis at the 1 percent significance level. t-statistics reported. 
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 Table 3. Dynamic gravity model. System GMM estimation results  
 
Periods 1962-69  1970-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-2000  2001-05 
LX (-1)  0.581 0.876  0.593  0.280  0.524  -0.0117  0.587  0.645 
  18.690 12.790  4.400  3.640 4.520  -0.070  4.010  7.090 
LYY  0.535 0.191  0.470  0.822  0.488  0.938  0.446  0.405 
  11.440 2.370  2.790  7.880 3.590  5.570 2.500  3.840 
LPOP  -0.215 -0.082  -0.172  -0.244  -0.0995 0.0754  -0.0863  -0.080 
  -5.38 -2.21  -1.93  -3.52  -1.35  0.66  -1.33  -1.41 
LEXRN  0.002 0.011  -0.023  -0.021  -0.012 -0.037  -0.008  -0.011 
  0.270 1.540  -1.230  -0.980  -0.690 -1.190  -0.670  -0.680 
LBAIDG  0.0819 0.0566  0.103  0.182 0.169  0.165 0.0935  0.0780 
  5.380 2.610  2.260  4.650  3.790  2.470  2.010  2.780 
LEUAIDG  -0.011 -0.016  0.010  0.026  -0.052 -0.123  -0.056  -0.033 
  -1.110 -0.880  0.240  0.520  -1.030 -1.680  -1.740  -0.900 
CONS  -3.987 -1.914  -3.817  -7.678  -4.457 -10.79  -4.611  -4.557 
  -8.360 -2.540  -2.270  -5.480  -2.780 -4.850  -2.190  -3.390 
Time Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Nobs  379 332  300  349  391  438  472  474 
Instruments  39 24  18  18  18  18  18  18 
Ar1  -4.169** -2.623**  -1.568 -1.971  -2.78 -2.618**  -2.615** -1.977 
Ar2  1.136   0.893  -0.348  1.252  1.818  -0.447  -0.500  0.757 
Hansen  25.59   12.94  4.831  5.416  7.057  4.956  10.240  9.610 
Hansen_df  26   13  8  8  8  8  8  8 
Return on 
Aid 
0.584 0.604  1.184  2.026  1.254  1.631  1.364  1.520 
Note: All the variables are in natural logarithms. The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices, 
LYY is the product of GDPs of Germany and recipient country j, LPOP is the product of populations of 
Germany and recipient country j, LEXCHRN is the bilateral exchange rate at current prices, LBAIDG is gross 
bilateral German aid to country j, and LEUAIDG is European Union aid to country j. A system of two equations 
is estimated, one in levels and the second one in first differences.*, **, *** denote rejection of the null 
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Table 4. Dynamic gravity model estimation results for sub-groups of countries 
(Equation in levels, yearly data) 
Variables BMZ  Non_BMZ  LDC  ACP 
LX(-1)  0.772 0.416  0.536 0.459 
  23.852 3.692  6.866  4.454 
LYY  0.222 0.447  0.269 0.285 
  5.566 4.746  3.333 3.892 
LPOP  -0.64 -0.261  -0.75 -0.529 
  -2.836 -0.277  -1.153 -0.752 
LEXRN  0.012 0.001  -0.023  -0.018 
  2.079 0.052  -1.456  -1.221 
LBAIDG  0.056 0.021  0.047 0.039 
  3.802 0.908  2.007 1.99 
LEUAIDG  -0.037 0.03  0.058  0.012 
  -2.167 1.029  1.735  0.434 
LDC  -0.058 -2.077     
  -1.135 -3.396     
ACP  -0.039 -0.273     
  -1.134 -2.821     
INDEP  2.108 -0.324  1.381  
  4.118 -1.308  2.823  
Time Effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Long-Run Aid Coeff  0.246 0.036  0.101 0.072 
Adj. R Sq.  0.862 0.542  0.556 0.542 
Nobs  1931 1346  1198 1699 
Log-Likelihood  -176.651 -1023.710  -773.505 -1070.444 
Hansen test  3.038 2.070  2.285 5.499 
Probability  0.552 0.723  0.683 0.240 
Return on Aid  2.82 0.77  0.15 0.28 
 
Note: The dependent variable is bilateral exports at current prices, LYY is the product of GDPs of Germany and 
recipient country j, LPOP is the product of populations of Germany and recipient country j, LEXCHRN is the 
bilateral exchange rate at current prices, LBAIDG is gross bilateral German aid to country j, and LEUAIDG is 
European Union aid to country j. All the equations were estimated in levels. BMZ denotes Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development.  denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent significance 
level. t-statistics reported. 
   28
 
 
Figure 1. Estimates of time-varying coefficients for bilateral aid in the 2SLS fixed-effects 
model  
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Appendix 
 
A.1 German ODA-to-GNI ratio (1964-2005) 
 
 















































Source: OECD (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd) and own elaboration.   32
Table A.3.1. Static model estimation results  
 
 
DAC Countries   OLS  Random Effects   Fixed Effects  
log of the GPD product yg*yj  0.728  0.818  0.768 
   (53.52)**  (31.66)**  (27.38)** 
log of the pop  0.141  0.085  -0.253 
 popg*popj  (8.95)**  (2.53)*  (2.53)* 
log of distance between capitals in   -0.851  -0.889  - 
 km  (-29.78)**  (-9.61)**  - 
log of gross ODA of Germany 1000   0.146  0.090  0.084 
 current $  (11.91)**  (7.89)**              (7.32)** 
leuaidg1000 -0.136  -0.034  -0.029 
   (9.90)**  (2.68)**  (2.26)* 
LDC -0.516  -0.413  -0.392 
   (-13.76)**  (-4.07)**  (-1.83) 
colony -0.008  -0.177  - 
   (-0.14)  (-0.86)  - 
ACP -0.190  -0.004  -0.02 
   (-5.24)**  (-0.09)  (-0.48) 
independent state  1.354  0.978  0.965 
   (7.07)**  (6.55)**  (6.42)** 
gatt wto membership  0.076  -0.028  -0.039 
   (2.52)*  (0.79)  (1.09) 
log of bilateral nominal exchange 
rate units of local currency per €  -0.027  -0.017  -0.024 
   (-4.99)**  (-2.38)*  (-3.20)** 
Constant 45.873  72.339  40.164 
   (20.39)**  (9.29)**  (4.34)** 
Observations 3837  3837  3837 
Number of group(country)  -  131  131 
Adjusted R-squared  0.870  -  - 
R-squared within  -  0.699  0.700 
R-squared between  -  0.918  0.798 
R-squared overall  -  0.875  0.773 
F-Stat./Wald-Stat. 1921.610  10181.140  160.800 
Prob. F-Stat./Wald Stat.  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Time fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Prob. of Breusch and Pagan La-
grangian multiplier test for random 
effects     0.000    
   33
Table  A.3.2. Static model estimation results. (Five-year intervals) 
 
DAC Countries   OLS  Random Effects   Fixed Effects  
log of the GPD product yg*yj  0.722  0.922  0.845 
   (24.80)**  (19.52)**  (14.98)** 
log of  the popultaions product  0.140  -0.018  -0.334 
 popg*popj  (-4.22)**  (-0.35)  (-1.82) 
log of distance between capitals in 
km -0.867  -0.857  - 
   (-14.43)**  (-7.81)**  - 
log of gross ODA of Germany 1000 
current $  0.138  0.119  0.11 
   (5.16)**  (4.99)**  (4.29)** 
leuaidg1000 -0.109  -0.022  -0.018 
   (-3.69)**  (-0.88)  (-0.67) 
LDC -0.544  -0.352  -0.412 
   (6.84)**  (2.63)**  (1.25) 
colony -0.125  -0.195  - 
   (-1.06)  (-0.81)  - 
ACP -0.167  0.092  0.069 
   (-2.05)*  (1.22)  (0.82) 
independent state  0.624  0.316  0.292 
   (2.33)*  (1.65)  (1.38) 
gatt wto membership  0.133  -0.038  -0.057 
   (2.01)*  (0.56)  (0.74) 
log of bilateral nominal exchange 
rate units of local currency per €  -0.026  -0.009  -0.018 
   (-2.36)*  (-0.76)  (-1.24) 
Constant 49.533  -1.609  -2.327 
   (10.22)**  (1.22)  (0.76) 
Observations 845  845  845 
Number of group(country)  -  131  131 
Adjusted R-squared  0.880  -  - 
R-squared within  -  0.775  0.777 
R-squared between  -  0.916  0.796 
R-squared overall  -  0.892  0.787 
F-Stat./Wald-Stat. 1921.610  3739.640  134.560 
Prob. F-Stat./Wald Stat.  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Time fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Country effects  No  Yes  Yes 
Prob. of Breusch and Pagan La-
grangian multiplier test for random 
effects     0.000    
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A.4 DAC list of ODA recipients  
 
Source: OECD. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd.   35
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A. 6. Country Classifications 
 
Countries BMZ LDC ACP 
1 Afghanistan  Afghanistan Angola 
2  Albania  Angola  Antigua and Barbuda 
3 Algeria  Bangladesh  Barbados 
4 Armenia  Benin  Belize 
5 Azerbaijan  Bhutan  Benin 
6 Bangladesh  Burkina  Faso  Botswana 
7 Belarus  Burundi  Burkina  Faso 
8 Benin  Cambodia  Cape  Verde 
9  Bolivia  Cape Verde  Central African Republic 
10 Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
Central African Republic  Chad 
11 Brazil  Chad  Comoros 
12  Burkina Faso  Comoros  Congo, Dem. Rep. 
13  Burundi  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Congo, Rep. 
14 Cambodia  Djibouti  Cote  d'Ivoire 
15 Cameroon  Equatorial  Guinea  Cuba 
16 Chad  Eritrea  Djibouti 
17 Chile  Ethiopia  Dominica 
18 China  Gambia  Dominican  Republic 
19 Colombia  Guinea  Equatorial  Guinea 
20  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Guinea-Bissau  Eritrea 
21 Costa  Rica  Haiti  Ethiopia 




24 Ecuador  Lesotho  Gambia 
25 Egypt  Liberia  Ghana 
26 El  Salvador  Madagascar  Grenada 
27 Eritrea  Malawi  Guinea 
28 Ethiopia  Maldives  Guinea-Bissau 
29 Georgia  Mali  Guyana 
30 Ghana  Mauritania  Haiti 
31 Guatemala  Mozambique  Jamaica 
32 Honduras  Myanmar  Kenya 
33 India  Nepal  Kiribati 
34 Indonesia  Niger  Lesotho 
35 Iran  Rwanda  Liberia 
36 Jordan  Samoa  Madagascar 
37  Kazakhstan  Sao Tome and Principe  Malawi 
38 Kenya  Senegal  Mali 
39  Kyrgyz Republic  Sierra Leone  Marshall Islands 
40 Laos  Solomon  Islands  Mauritania 
41 Lebanon  Somalia  Mauritius 
42 Lesotho  Tanzania  Micronesia 
43 Madagascar  Timor-Leste  Mozambique 
44 Malawi  Togo  Namibia 
45 Mali  Uganda  Niger 
46 Mauritania  Vanuatu  Nigeria 
47 Mexico  Yemen  Palau 
48  Moldova  Zambia  Papua New Guinea 
49 Mongolia    Rwanda 
50 Morocco    Samoa 
51  Mozambique    Sao Tome and Principe   37
52 Myanmar    Senegal 
53 Namibia    Seychelles 
54 Nepal    Sierra  Leone 
55 Nicaragua    Solomon  Islands 
56 Niger    Somalia 
57 Nigeria    South  Africa 
58  Pakistan    St. Kitts and Nevis 
59 Paraguay    St.  Lucia 
60  Peru    St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
61 Philippines    Sudan 
62 Rwanda    Suriname 
63 Senegal    Swaziland 
64 Serbia  and 
Montenegro 
 Tanzania 
65 South  Africa    Timor-Leste 
66 Sri  Lanka    Togo 
67 Sudan    Tonga 
68  Syria    Trinidad and Tobago 
69 Tajikistan    Uganda 
70 Tanzania    Vanuatu 
71 Thailand    Zambia 
72 Tunisia    Zimbabwe 
73 Turkey     
74 Uganda     
75 Ukraine     
76 Vietnam     
77 Zambia     
 